Migrants' remittances have grown extraordinarily over the last twenty years. According to the Migration Policy Institute, money sent home by migrants worldwide increased from US$ 68.6 billions in 1990 to US$ 131.5 billions in 2000 and 280.9 billions in 2006. More than 70% of these flows goes to developing countries. Worker's remittances are now the second largest source of external finance after foreign direct investment and represent almost double the official aid to developing countries.
While there can be little doubt as to the positive effects of remittances on the standard of living for the recipient households, the macroeconomic impact of remittances is in principle ambiguous: it depends on the expenditures they fund ( investment versus consumption ), the activity they stimulate (work versus leisure) and the appreciation of the real exchange rate they produce. Consistently, empirical findings on the remittances-growth nexus are mixed (Chami et al. 2003; Mundaca 2005; Catrinescu et al. 2009 ).
What determines a country's capacity to profit from migrants' remittances? A natural candidate to make remittances effective for growth is the level of financial development in the recipient's country. As it is well documented, access to credit is one of the major constraints for entrepreneurial activities in developing countries (Rapoport and Docquier 2005) . Moreover, remittances seem to further financial development in recipients' countries which, in turn, has been shown to play a key role in reducing poverty, inequality and fostering economic growth (Aggarwal et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2009) . Therefore, at first sight one should expect complementarity between remittances and financial development in the growth of GDP in developing countries. Apart from removing liquidity constraints and facilitating access to credit for the migrant's relatives, remittance inflows, if efficiently intermediated, should allow the funding of growth-enhancing projects by talented but financially constrained entrepreneurs.
Surprisingly enough, however, a recent study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) has provided evidence of substitutability between remittances and financial development in fostering growth. On analysing a set of 73 developing countries for the period 1975-2002, they found that remittance inflows are positively associated with economic growth only in countries where financial systems are not well developed. They interpret this finding in the sense that remittances compensate for inefficient credit markets, allowing recipients to accumulate financial resources to self-finance physical and human capital investments. By contrast, where credit markets work properly, access to credit is no longer an issue and remittances go to subsidize recipients' consumption and weaken incentives to work. Following this reasoning, the substitutability between remittances and financial development would come from the different uses which recipient households make of the resources transferred by migrants in different financial environments, implicitly assuming that remittances are for the most part not intermediated by banks.
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) measure financial development with the traditional quantitybased indicators like the ratio of liquid liabilities or credit provided by the banking sector to GDP. As remittances directly affect the magnitude of bank liquid liabilities and credit granted, the complementarity effect could simply capture a decreasing marginal impact of the size of the banking system on growth. Above and beyond, quantity-based indicators of financial development do not satisfactorily capture the bank's key functions of selecting entrepreneurs and channelling savings (remittances) towards worthy investment projects, functions that, instead, can be well approximated by quality-based indicators of the microeconomic efficiency of banks 1 . Obviously, the size of the domestic banking system, the whole amount of credit granted and the efficiency of local banks are not necessarily correlated. Efficient screening and monitoring of borrowers imply the rejection of all the negative net present value projects by banks, and may well be consistent with a lower credit supply.
Using a quality-based indicator of financial development, in this paper we find support for the complementarity hypothesis and show that remittances enhance economic growth only in countries where banks are sufficiently efficient 2 . This result is robust to controls for quantity-based indicators of financial development and for other institutional quality indexes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the estimated models, data and variables; Section III presents descriptive evidence and econometric results; Section IV concludes.
II. ESTIMATED MODELS AND VARIABLES

A. Models and methodology
Following Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) , the basic model we estimate is a growth regression including the ratio of remittances to GDP, the level of financial development, an interaction term between these two variables and the set of controls described hereinafter:
[ ] where the sign and significance of the coefficient 4 α are used to discriminate between the substitutability and complementarity hypotheses.
However, financial development and the efficiency of domestic banks could capture a more general effect of the quality of governments and institutions. This is especially true in developing countries where the degree of integrity of politicians and bureaucrats, the design of regulation and the application of the rule of law can be so poor as to make the presence of sound financial 2 The complementarity result is also found by Mundaca (2005) by using standard quantity-based indicators of financial development for countries in Central America, namely Mexico and the Dominican Republic. However, unlike Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) , her empirical strategy is simply to show that the effect of remittances on the GDP rate of growth becomes stronger when credit from domestic banks is simultaneously included in the estimated growth equation, without considering the interaction between remittances and financial development explicitly (see equation (1) As it is well known, due to the high transaction costs of using the formal banking sector, a large part of migrants' remittances go through informal channels like "hawala" or "hundi" and cannot be recorded in the BoP statistics 5 . Obviously, to the extent that the non-official remittances are proportional to the official ones, the estimated effect of remittances on growth is not affected by the omission of the former. However, the informal channels for sending remittances might be more important where the deficiencies of the formal banking channel are greater. Actually, in our sample remittances are not significantly correlated with the efficiency of banks (see below Table 2 ) and therefore we can assume confidently that the global effect of remittances on growth is not very different from the effect found by using the official statistics on remittances.
With regard to financial development, we use two out of four traditional quantity-based indicators employed in the study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz. In particular, we employ the ratio of liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP (M2) and the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP (CREDIT) 6 . Data come from World Development Indicators database. In
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Fed., Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. With respect to the study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, Barbados, Eritrea, Mauritania, Samoa, Tonga and Zimbabwe are excluded due to lack of data availability. 4 Item codes in the Balance of Payments are 2391, 2310 and 2431 respectively. 5 As reported by Gupta et al. (2009) , the fees paid by migrants in the United Kingdom to send remittances through formal channels may be as much as 15% of the total amount. 6 We also ran regressions with the other two indicators employed by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (the ratio of bank deposits to GDP and the ratio of claims on the private sector to GDP), but the estimated coefficient α4 was usually nonsignificant (results available from the authors).
addition, we build an inefficiency index of the national banking system on the basis of the widely employed cost to income ratio 7 For example, see Campa and Hernando (2006) . 8 With respect to the study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), we excluded the years of education (which they found rarely significant) due to lack of data availability. . With respect to the Kaufman indicators, ICRG indicators cover a longer time span (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , even if they are available for only 57 of the 66 countries in our sample.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Descriptive statistics Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics and correlation for the variables of interest. Remittances on average correspond to 3.5% of GDP in our sample, but there are countries like Jordan, Haiti, El
Salvador and Jamaica where they can also account for more than 15% of GDP. The pairwise correlation between remittances and GDP growth is negative, but extremely weak and nonsignificant. As for financial indicators, what emerges is that developing countries display a great variability of financial development, especially with regard to the efficiency of the domestic banking 9 CONTROL OF CORRUPTION measures people's perceptions of corruption; REGULATORY QUALITY measures the incidence of market-unfriendly regulation like price controls or inadequate bank supervision; RULE OF LAW quantifies the confidence of the agents in the rules of society and in the protection of property rights; VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY measures the citizens' participation in politics; POLITICAL STABILITY represents the risk of sudden and violent changes in government; GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS captures the ability of the government to implement good policies. All indicators vary between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better institutions. 10 The POLITICAL RISK RATING includes 12 weighted variables covering both political and social aspects. The ECONOMIC RISK RATING includes five economic variables to assess a country's economic strength, while the aim of FINANCIAL RISK RATING is to measure a country's ability to finance its official, commercial and trade debt obligations. The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, Financial and Economic Risk on 50 points. The total points from the three indices are then weighted to produce the COMPOSITE RATE INDEX. For every index, the highest overall rating indicates the lowest risk, and the lowest rating indicates the highest risk. [Insert Table 1 With both the traditional quantity-based indicators, a sort of substitutability relationship between remittances and financial development in fostering economic growth seems to exist. In countries with levels of M2 and CREDIT under the median, remittances and growth appear to be uncorrelated, while the relationship becomes strongly negative at high levels of financial development, especially if we exclude Jordan. When we consider the inefficiency of the domestic banking system, however, financial development and remittances seem to be complements to economic growth. When the inefficiency of local banks is low, growth and remittances are positively correlated (once again, Jordan is an outlier), while for high levels of BANKS' INEFFICIENCY the relation between growth and remittances reverses.
[Insert Figure 1] 
B. Regression results
Regression results for the basic model with financial development measured by standard quantity indicators (Table 3) are only partly consistent with the findings of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) .
Like the latter study, we find evidence of a convergence process, a positive correlation between investments and GDP growth and a nil effect of the economy's openness. By contrast, we find that population growth and government expenditures negatively affect economic growth and that the adverse impact of inflation is only rarely significant.
Moving on to our key variables, the coefficients on REMITTANCES and FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT are significantly positive in SGMM estimates when financial development is measured by M2, while they are not significant when it is proxied by the amount of loans to the private sector (CREDIT)
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. Whatever the measure of financial development, however, the marginal impact of remittance flows on economic growth seems to decrease when the level of financial development is higher, confirming the existence of substitutability between remittances and the aggregate quantity of finance in the country.
[Insert Table 3] Things change when we consider the quality of domestic banks and take BANKS'
INEFFICIENCY as a measure of financial development (Table 4) . In this case, remittances and financial development are positively correlated with economic growth and, what is more interesting, they seem to have a complementary effect in boosting the growth of GDP. These results hold regardless of the estimation method when we use five-year data; with annual data they hold only in SGMM estimates (Table 4 , columns 6).
Therefore, consistently with the information gathering and monitoring functions of banks, our findings indicate that remittances have a positive effect on economic growth only if the domestic banking system is sufficiently sound. To be precise, if we take column 6, the value of bank inefficiency for which the remittance impact becomes zero is 52.72, while the sample mean (median) is 63.25 (61.8) . This means that countries like the Russian Federation, China or Malaysia, where the inefficiency of the domestic banking system is far below the threshold of 52.72, can benefit from remittances in terms of economic growth. By contrast, the growth of Argentina, Costa Rica or Swaziland risks being adversely affected by migrants' remittances due to the inefficiency of their banking system.
[Insert Table 4 ]
To test the robustness of the complementarity result, in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 we include both qualitative and quantitative financial development indicators. REMITTANCES, BANKS'
INEFFICIENCY and their interaction are still significant and with the expected signs, regardless of the sample splitting, while M2 and CREDIT are hardly ever significant.
Finally, Table 5 reports SGMM estimates of equation [2] case, what is important is that, after controlling for the quality of the institutional environment, the complementarity between remittances and the efficiency of domestic banks in economic growth is not rejected at a 1 % level of confidence, regardless of the specification considered.
[Insert Table 5] The last four columns of Like us, they found no direct or indirect (via remittances) effect of the political risk composite indicator on growth. However, when they split this indicator into their components they found that many of such components, like ethnic tension or government stability, are positively associated to growth.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we analysed the relationship between remittances and the level of financial development in economic growth. Moving on from the study by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), where financial development is proxied with the traditional quantity-based indicators, we introduced a new quality-based measure regarding the inefficiency of the domestic banking system. Using a panel of 66 developing countries for the period 1991-2005, we showed that an efficient banking system complements the positive effect of remittances on GDP growth. Remittance flows not only relax liquidity constraints and guarantee access to credit, but can also contribute, when mediated by an efficient banking system, to funding growth-enhancing projects. This result is robust to controls for other quantity-based measures of financial development and the quality of other institutions. 
